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Not Losing Major Liberal and Rawlsian Insights
Comment on Gavin Kerr
Abstract: In this comment I challenge Kerr's claim that a coherent expression of a `lib-
eralism of freedom' needs an extended ﬁrst Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating
the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended
ﬁrst principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual
responsibility for choice and eﬀort way too much. Second, such an extended ﬁrst prin-
ciple misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle
securing basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve diﬀerent
purposes.
A coherent and powerful expression of a `liberalism of freedom' needs not only
the institutional regime of property-owning democracy (POD) dispersing wealth
and capital as widely as possible, but also an extended ﬁrst Rawlsian principle of
justice. An extended ﬁrst principle of justice not only incorporates the classical
civil and political rights and liberties such as freedom of thought, liberty of
conscience, the political liberties and freedom of association but also the principle
of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) (11). These are, as I see it, the main claims
of Gavin Kerr in his contribution to this special issue. I agree with Kerr that it is
diﬃcult to uphold the priority Rawls claims for his ﬁrst principle of justice over
the FEO principle, but I do not think one should view equality of opportunity
being part of a principle securing basic liberties (cf. Wallimann-Helmer 2012;
2013, ch. 4). I fear that major liberal and Rawlsian insights are lost if the FEO
principle is simply integrated in Rawls's ﬁrst principle of justice. What is lost on
the one hand is that in liberalism it is normally in the responsibility of citizens
to reach whatever level of happiness they please. On the other hand and more
importantly, there is a loss of the diﬀerent functions that can be ascribed to the
ﬁrst principle of justice and the FEO principle if they are kept apart.
Kerr provides two arguments for his main conclusion. First, he argues that
POD in combination with the two principles of justice as presented by Rawls
would still be a liberalism with a utilitarian ﬂavour. Giving priority to the ﬁrst
principle of justice over the FEO principle would still allow for major inequalities
in the possession of productive assets and non-human capital simply because they
result in a higher net sum of welfare (12). According to Kerr, however, if POD
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is an institutional regime ensuring equal economic and political freedom for all,
indefeasible social and economic rights must be secured not only to ensure the
exercise of the classical civil rights and liberties but also the pursuit of individual
conceptions of the good (11). Pursuing a conception of the good needs those
economic and social resources Rawls himself attached to the FEO principle. In
consequence, Kerr believes that, for POD to be a true form of a `liberalism of
freedom', what is needed is an extended ﬁrst principle of justice including not
only basic civil rights and liberties but the FEO principle as well.
I share Kerr's concern that the social and economic rights Rawls attaches to
his ﬁrst principle of justice have an overly narrow focus if they only secure the
classical civil rights and liberties. For citizens to be free, they need not only to
possess the resources necessary to be able to exercise their basic civil rights and
liberties. They need also to be endowed with the social and economic means
necessary to be able to choose responsibly among diﬀerent plans of life as well
asat least in some minimal senseto realise them. Most importantly, social
and economic capital needs to be invested in their education. Everyone should
be able to calculate, to read and to have at least a minimal understanding
of the political, economic, social, cultural and religious systems they live in
and minimal knowledge of the options they provide. But granting everyone an
indefeasible right to all the social and economic resources necessary to pursue
their conception of the good, as Kerr suggests, on my view overshoots the target.
The reason for this can be found in Rawls's deﬁnition of `liberalisms of free-
dom' itself. True `liberalism of freedom' is not so much concerned with the net
sum of welfare reached in a society but rather with securing liberty for all its
citizens. Or as Kerr puts it: While liberalisms of freedom provide citizens with
the all-purpose means needed eﬀectively to exercise their freedoms, they do not
seek to guarantee citizens' happiness, `for that is a matter for citizens them-
selves' (Rawls 2000, 366). (3) According to this understanding, a `liberalism
of freedom' seeks to leave it to the responsible decisions of citizens how much
happiness they will achieve. This means that, in Rawlsian terms, it is left to
the individual citizens themselves how well they realise their conception of the
good, or more speciﬁcally, their rational plan of life. Thus, there seems to be a
misunderstanding of the conception of liberty involved in Kerr's argument.
Being free to do or realise something normally means that you are not guar-
anteed to realise whatever you choose. But if there were an indefeasible right to
all social and economic resources needed to pursue one's conception of the good,
this would imply exactly such a guarantee. If I would decide right now, after
having been trained as a philosopher and teacher for so many years, that being
a professional tennis player is a better way to pursue my conception of the good,
the way I understand Kerr's argument, I would have to be endowed with the
necessary social and economic resources to realise this plan of life. According to
Kerr's argument, this would even be true independently of the question whether
my plan is rational or not and whether or not I take my decision responsibly.
If I have an indefeasible right to the social and economic resources necessary
to pursue whatever conception of the good I develop, then the fulﬁlment of my
right cannot rely on any conditions such as rationality or responsibility. In sum,
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this is not our usual understanding of a right to be endowed with the necessary
resources to exercise our liberties.
Rather, someone capable of exercising his liberties is usually understood as
someone possessing those abilities as well as the social and economic resources
conceived as minimally necessary to make responsible and well informed rational
choices. I believe that to be able to reach such a minimal standard is what should
be conceived as the bundle of indefeasible rights and liberties belonging to an
extended ﬁrst Rawlsian principle of justice. It is only this minimal standard and
no right to all social and economic resources one might need to pursue one's
conception of the good. Otherwise, it would become unclear why the degree and
the manner in which someone realises his conception of the good lies in his and
only in his own responsibility and rational choice. It would become unclear why
a `liberalism of freedom' conceives the amount of happiness reached by individual
citizens to be their own matter.
These last points already shed some lights on my criticism of Kerr's second
and main argument for an extended ﬁrst principle of justice. This second argu-
ment directly attacks Rawls's claim that his ﬁrst principle of justice has priority
over the second, especially over the FEO principle. Rawls argues that securing
the basic rights and liberties should have priority over securing FEO because
human beings have a highest-order interest in developing and revising a concep-
tion of the good (Rawls 1993, 310ﬀ.). To secure this highest-order interest, it
is necessary that advantages such as more equal opportunities or more material
resources cannot be traded oﬀ against citizens' basic rights and liberties (Rawls
2001, 47). According to Kerr, the priority of the ﬁrst principle over the FEO
principle cannot plausibly be defended with this argument, since reforming and
revising a conception of the good can scarcely be separated from the interest
in realizing the rational plan of life stemming from a conception of the good
(11). Realizing a rational plan of life, Kerr believes, is not secured by the ﬁrst
principle of justice but by the FEO principle. Therefore, it becomes diﬃcult to
claim any priority of the ﬁrst principle of justice over the second containing the
FEO principle.
Kerr certainly has a point in claiming that it is hardly plausible to separate
a highest-order interest in forming and revising a conception of the good from
the interest in the realization of the rational plan of life stemming from it. But
in A Theory of Justice Rawls proposes that liberty must be understood along
the lines proposed by MacCallum (Rawls 1971, 202). MacCallum argues that
positive and negative liberty must be understood as two sides of a coin exactly
for the reasons given by Kerr to challenge the priority of the ﬁrst principle of
justice over the second (MacCallum 1967, 318f.). It simply makes no sense to
claim a right of everyone to be entitled to reach a certain level of endowments
to be free (positive liberty) without at the same time guaranteeing an adequate
space of action to freely exercise those endowments to one's advantage (negative
liberty). Thus, to the extent that Rawls argues that liberty must be understood
in line with MacCallum, Kerr's argument loses its grip. The ﬁrst principle of
justice (not extended in Kerr's sense) cannot only secure the development and
revision of a conception of the good but also the possibility of pursuing it.
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In consequence, Rawls cannot be accused of not having shown why his ﬁrst
principle of justice should have priority over the second by the line of argument
provided by Kerr. It is not the case that the ﬁrst principle does not secure the
possibilities to realise a rational plan of life. The basic liberties and rights secured
by the ﬁrst principle, however, only ensure these possibilities by guaranteeing a
certain minimum of abilities as well as social and economic resources. How well
someone is able to realise his rational plan of life beyond this minimum is only
formally secured by ensuring that no one is unjustiﬁably hindered in pursuing
it. But such a formal right does not grant any substantial assistance.
Kerr might counter this argument by putting his ﬁnger particularly on this
last point. For a regime of POD, it is not enough that substantial minimum
and formal rights beyond this minimum are secured to pursue one's conception
of the good. This is why the ﬁrst principle of justice should be extended to
include the FEO principle, which is concerned with the distribution of social
and economic resources necessary to realise goals beyond the minimum secured
by basic rights and liberties. But undiﬀerentiated incorporation of the FEO
principle into the ﬁrst principle of justice loses sight of a major insight in Rawls's
theory. Arguing for an indefeasible, hence unconditional, right to all social and
economic resources one envisages needing for the pursuit of one's conception
of the good would not allow the ascription of responsibility to citizens for the
advantages and disadvantages they reach by their own eﬀort.
Citizens would not have to take responsibility for their bad choices because an
indefeasible right to the social and economic resources to pursue one's conception
of the good justiﬁes entitlements irrespective of whether or not someone's choice
was responsible. Moreover, an indefeasible right to social and economic resources
to pursue one's conception of the good would place most part of the advantages
gained at the mercy of social institutions. If someone becomes a professional
tennis player by obtaining all the resources needed to reach this goal irrespective
of how hard he trains, it is only to a very small extent he himself who deserves
being a professional tennis player. In most part, it is the social institutions who
take responsibility for him being able to reach his goal. Not being responsible for
one's bad choices and having not to take the full responsibility for one's success
are both illiberal consequences of Kerr's proposal. They are in conﬂict with a
`liberalism of freedom' that understands it as a matter for citizens how much
happiness (success) they attain by realizing a rational plan of life.
This makes it clear why it is necessary in liberalism to distinguish between
indefeasible rights and liberties on the one hand and the FEO principle on the
other. Whilst indefeasible rights and liberties must be secured unconditionally,
irrespective of responsibility and eﬀort, the FEO principle can formulate condi-
tional claims of justice depending on eﬀort and responsibility. Only those who
make responsible choices and show the necessary eﬀort are entitled to fairly equal
opportunities. Furthermore, such a conditional right can take into account dif-
ferences in advantage with regard to social and economic circumstances. Some-
one ﬁnding himself in disadvantageous social and economic circumstances by no
choice or fault of his own is entitled to more assistance. In both cases, in the case
of more responsible choices and more eﬀort as well as in the case of disadvantage
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through no choice or fault of one's own, there is a right to a higher degree of
assistance than for cases in which these conditions are not given. An extended
ﬁrst principle of justice which secures these claims unconditionally would cancel
the possibility of diﬀerentiating between these conditionals.
Simply integrating the FEO principle in the ﬁrst principle of justice thus
loses sight of a major Rawlsian insight. These principles each serve a diﬀerent
purpose in a theory of justice. The ﬁrst principle of justice unconditionally
guarantees both a minimum of competences and a space of action for their
exercise. In so doing, it secures for all citizens not only the right to form and
revise whatever conception of the good that pleases them but also the possibility
to realise whatever rational plan of life they wish to pursue. The FEO principle,
in contrast, serves the purpose of securing a conditional right of citizens to fairly
equal opportunities if they show equal eﬀort irrespective of their social and
economic circumstances.
It is another question, however, whether the distinction between Rawls's ﬁrst
principle of justice and the FEO principle must be drawn by assigning the ﬁrst
principle priority over the latter, and how they relate if the distinction is drawn
diﬀerently.1 But I hope to have made clear that the diﬀerent functions in a
theory of justice assigned to both principles is lost if the FEO principle is simply
integrated into the ﬁrst principle of justice. In fact, doing so, as Kerr suggests,
leads to consequences that in my view must be conceived as being simply illiberal.
Therefore, I strongly suggest not conﬂating Rawls's ﬁrst principle of justice with
the FEO principle so as not to lose major liberal and Rawlsian insights.
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